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“O had his powerful destiny ordained / Me some inferior angel, I had stood / Then happy; no
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unbounded hope had raised / Ambition.”
Part I: Ambitions
Beginnings
In 1990 a woman named Nancy, a Peace Corps worker in southern Madagascar,
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received a marriage proposal from a man she did not know. It was Easter Monday, a national
holiday for the Malagasy, and the man had been drinking; his proposal included a dowry of a
very substantial number of cattle, an animal of tremendous cultural and material wealth in this
part of Madagascar. Nancy—not knowing the man—declined.
The man was what is known there as a dahalo, a cattle thief, and took this rejection as
a serious blow, especially given the magnitude of his offer. It was known that she would be
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traveling by bicycle the next afternoon to a village some distance away. She had a meeting
there. He gathered several fellow dahalo and, while she was en route to the village, they

Comment [c4]: This story could use
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ambushed her. The men raped and then murdered her.
I heard the story of Nancy’s death some 15 years later. By that time this dahalo had
been brought to trial and imprisoned; escaped, and been imprisoned once more. He died in jail
of tuberculosis. His crime, like all such, seems startling, almost incomprehensible, the kind of
thing no one should have foreseen. But there emerges in this story a connection between
marriage, terrible violence—and dahalo. Dahalo are still a strong presence in cattle-raising
3
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Madagascar (and indeed throughout), and in this paper I will ask why people become dahalo,
and hope to further explore and tease out this connection.
It seems vitally important not to lose sight of the fact that it is people who become
dahalo; not characters, not actors, and not a priori or de facto dahalo. Nancy’s story—the
story not of her life, but of her death—is only one such story. There are others. 1 During my
fieldwork I met a religious man who had, in his youth, had a close friend who was a dahalo.
They would sit around at night and swap stories: the dahalo would tell the religious man of
his raids, and then my friend in his turn would tell his friend of the religious life. These are
people, with agency, that bring this violence, and they could choose otherwise. I like to
imagine that it is a choice they may not have made, given different circumstances. Perhaps by
better understanding the choice and the circumstances, we can imagine a social environment
in which becoming a cattle thief is no longer the best choice. That is the hope with which I
began this research.
To trace out this phenomenon of dahalo—what I will turn soon to calling the
phenomena of dahalo—I took as my starting point a hypothesis informed by the field of
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evolutionary psychology. I will turn first to exploring the theoretical underpinnings of this
research, which draws primarily from evolutionary psychology. This informs the questions
and methodology I followed. I will then sketch the context in which people become dahalo,
and outline in broad form the many phenomena of dahalo and their interrelationships. Then
we’ll dive into the explicit and implicit support for my hypothesis: that men become dahalo to
increase their reproductive outlook, given an environment (in the broadest sense of the term)
Comment [c7]: I can amend these
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why.

in which they have little chance otherwise to become reproductively competitive.
Theoretical Background
Because my analysis will at times tend towards an apparent denial of human agency,
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an overemphasis on things irrevocably “biological,” I want to begin with a diagram.
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The difficulty will be to show that these stories are not incompatible; that we can talk about both at the same
time without cheapening either.
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Drawing Hands, M.C. Escher – lithograph, 1947

This lithograph by M.C. Escher ripples into many levels of human activity, and
informs, among other things, the pursuit of science. Science is a tool for action, for bringing
change to the world. (The trick, as Richard Dawkins has said, is to want the right things.)
Studies of human nature, especially when they announce hard conclusions, can appear to
make human behavior inevitable. I hope to lean hard, throughout this paper, on the fact that it
is the conditionality of human behavior that I discover here, the variety and sensitivity of
available paths. We too are a part of our world, we too are natural. But we have this odd gift
of changing our environment, and, too, of changing ourselves, of introspection and recursion.
We are Escher’s hand drawing the hand.
And I will steer hard away from classical sociological explanations: I do not want to
explain social facts by social facts alone, as Emile Durkheim proposed. There is a problem
with chalking human behavior up to culture. It builds a wall, an apparent inevitability; at best,
such explanations offer no route around and away from their observations, they hit an
unpassable wall, and at worst they become circular. Just as there is no such thing as a human
Comment [c9]: And maybe this
should be after I explain evolutionary
psych.

being without culture, human beings are never not biological.
I advance these notions by way of making an argument for considering, in this paper,
the biological foundations of culture. If we believe that evolution by natural selection
produced organisms and all their traits, that theory does not describe a universe distinct from
the one anthropologists attempt to explain. Specifically, I will argue that, in order to
understand the phenomena of dahalo from a micro-social level, a perspective grounded in
evolutionary psychology is singularly useful.
Evolutionary
adaptations.
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successful in past environments, and so were passed down to succeeding generations.
Evolution by natural selection will tend to produce behaviors that conferred reproductive
advantages on the ancestors of the current generation—behaviors that work against successful
reproduction, or behaviors that are neutral, will not be selected for. Note that the success of a
trait depends on the environment; the environment is the crucible that determines any given
trait’s contribution to fitness. Specifically, evolutionary psychology argues that most modern
human traits must have solved adaptive problems during a period in the recent evolutionary
past called the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), a period before the advent
of agriculture when human societies were small, nomadic, and organized by kinship, and
resources were obtained by hunting and gathering.
Many social psychologists have dismissed “biological” explanations on the grounds of
observed cultural and individual variation: “According to this argument,” note Buss and
Shackelford, “ ‘biological’ represents those things that are invariant, and so evidence of
cultural or individual variability requires nonbiological explanations” (606) True: human
behavior is not rigid. Yet to model humans as lumps of clay whose behavior is determined by
things external to them is to miss the point entirely. Behavior is always a response to a
stimulus, either from the external or internal environment, and without some (biological)
mechanism dictating what responses follow which stimulus, no response is possible. Pure
lumps of clay do not react to stimuli; do not, when stared at, shout or turn away or stare back.
For these, a mechanism is needed. Biology, then, is highly relevant, even (and especially) to
variously-cultured, context-sensitive animals such as ourselves.
One of the key expansions evolutionary psychology offers to traditional psychology is
a unifying foundation for empirical research: an understanding of evolution by natural
selection, and of the EEA, allows the formation of testable hypotheses that address what the
mind is for. An understanding of purpose offers a toehold into explaining the nature of human
psychology and behavior. Humans offer an at first bewildering variety of behaviors, across
cultures and across individuals and within individuals, that, if one follows traditional
psychology, must be explored in more of a hit-or-miss fashion than a purposeful one.
Buss and Shackelford, informed by an evolutionary psychology perspective, ask what
adaptive problems generally may be solved by the use of aggression. “What contexts trigger
aggression, and can they be predicted and explained by specific hypotheses about the

about the entire field. Its insights and methods should be the groundwork for the study of psychology, not an
afterthought” (Gaulin and McBurney).
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adaptive functions of aggression?” This is a question I will follow. They ask also, “Can
individual and cultural variation in aggression be explained by variations in the degree
to which individuals and groups confront the classes of adaptive problems to which
aggression is a functional solution?” (1997). And I will propose, in fact, that aggression can
be explained this way, at least in part: that dahalo appear in contexts where violence would
have increased reproductive chances more than it would have cost in increased risk.
A study based in evolutionary psychology by Daly and Wilson serves to illustrate, and
informs at the same time my own study. 3 Daly and Wilson, attempting to understand violence
in urban neighborhoods, proposed that violence functioned, in the EEA, to secure the
resources necessary to attract a mate. Violence as a strategy, as with all strategies, has costs
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and benefits; violence tends to invite retribution, but offers, potentially, a means of quickly
increasing one’s resources. Modern humans should possess mental mechanisms that advocate
a turn to violence when the average benefits to fitness exceed the average costs to fitness, i.e.,
when the risk of having no opportunity to reproduce (measured always against one’s
competitors, who also contribute to the environment) is greater than the risks (perhaps of
death) posed by following a violent strategy. In sum, they proposed a mental mechanism,
designed by natural selection, that would guide action in the following way: if a nonviolent
strategy means no opportunity to reproduce, and thus pass one’s genes on to the next
generation, then people should be willing to kill, and risk death themselves, if that gives them
at least some chance securing the resources necessary to attract a mate. People in the past who
did not have this mechanism would be less likely to become our descendants. Daly and
Wilson, then, analyzed homicide rates and life expectancy in Chicago neighborhoods, taking
life expectancy (controlled for the effects of homicide rates) as a measure of the opportunity
to be reproductively successful, and homicide rates as a measure of the prevalence of violent
strategies. Life expectancy varied between some neighborhoods by as much as 23 years—a
significant loss, in terms of reproductive opportunities—and was found to predict very
successfully the variation in homicide rates between neighborhoods (Daly and Wilson 1988).
Over the long term, only people who switch to violence in these circumstances, and their
descendants, are left. Behavior is condition-dependent, environmentally sensitive. We are.
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Methods and Questions
In order to examine these phenomena of dahalo, then, and understand how and why
violence becomes the best strategy for these young men, a perspective of evolutionary
psychology suggests an attention to the environment and to the mechanism. What is it in the
environment that cues a recourse to violent strategies? How do these strategies promise to
amend or ameliorate the situation, and result in an increase in reproductive fitness? With this
perspective informing my research, I conducted a field study in the region of southern
Madagascar between the towns of Ambalavao and Ihosy, a region historically populated by
the Bara and Betsileo ethnic groups, and a region that is prime cattle country—Ambalavao is
home to the second largest cattle market in the nation, and is a nexus for cattle merchants
from across the south. There I followed these questions through interviews with experts on the
subject: local informants. These included members of the gendarmerie, staff at a school that
houses many children of dahalo, local officials, and residents of Ihosy and Ambalavao, as
well as residents of the Fandana and Ambalamatsara villages. I visited too one “typical”
village, 4 Ambalamatsara, a village too small to show up on my map, roughly halfway
between Ihosy and Ambalavao. My stay lasted a morning rather than the hoped week, but it
was enough to offer at least some context for dahalo.
I may have spoken with practicing dahalo, or I may not have—especially given my
identity as a foreigner, revealing the identities of dahalo was something most informants were
quite wary of. They may be among us even here, they would say; anyone might be a dahalo.
And everyone in a village knows who the dahalo are. But they would “never on their life”
reveal this, as one gendarme put it, fairly typically (Commandant, Ambalavao). To illustrate
the consequences of revealing the identity of a dahalo, Fanahy gave the example of a villager
who snitched to the gendarmes. The revealed dahalo would stop the inquiry with bribes, and
then give the gendarmes a little more money and ask who the snitch had been; the gendarmes
will tell him, “It was M. Rakoto,” and, “that same day, Rakoto is finished.” This example is
typical of my informants, who often suggested the same, perhaps with two fingers extended in
the shape of a gun. Even openly asking questions about dahalo in dahalo territory was
advised against; I risked my life, my informants told me, as well as the safety of the school
that was, if unofficially, hosting me. One man suggested I use the code word “theft,” in
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English, instead of “dahalo”—dahalo being a word that any passersby might hear, and jump
to too-hasty conclusions. “Theft” will be safer, he said.
Still, I would have liked to spend more time with people I could be sure were in very
close contact with dahalo; this study would have benefited much from concrete, grounded
examples, in tandem with the stories I was able to elicit. I nearly had the opportunity to spend
a week in a village in “red zone” dahalo country, but was unable to secure a translator. During
my three weeks, I did speak with one source who had at least one son who was a dahalo;
similarly, I saw many children of dahalo. This one degree of separation was as close as I was
(knowingly) able to approach dahalo. And this distance from the dahalo, slight though it is,
forms a significant limitation to this study. It was not armchair research, but nor did I
penetrate deep into the phenomenon. That I did not is a peculiar consequence of my power
and visibility in such a setting, as a (white) foreign researcher, and the short amount of time I
spent in the field. I feel that there is a strong possibility that I might have overcome any
mistrust, given a translator to aid communication; alas, I lacked that, and such mundanities do
impact research. An awareness of this distance from the phenomenon studied, however, has
been valuable in its own way. Wilson has said that “there is no single, authentic, indigenous
voice or reality that the researcher can discover and present to the world. Such things can be
the stuff of romantic myths, at best useless, at worst dangerous…” And, again, “researchers
should remind themselves of the limitations of their knowledge and judgment” (181, 183). I
have been reminding myself, and this always apparent distance from the dahalo has been
helping to prod my sometimes stubborn memory along.
Setting (Isolation)
To understand any human behavior, we must simultaneously attempt to understand the
environment and context in which that behavior arises, or, to put a finer point on the matter, to
which it responds. I take dahalo, the subject of this study, as one form of violence, but why
does the violence take this form?

Why steal cattle particularly, and why does the

phenomenon take the shape it does?. The first step in answering these questions will be
understanding the setting in which dahalo live.
My study centered on the region of south-central Madagascar inhabited by the Bara
ethnic group. It is among the more sparsely populated regions of Madagascar, characterized
by expansive hills and occasional rocky outcroppings. The primary vegetation cover is
dhanga grass. The grass, well over a person’s height when mature, is controlled by frequent
9

brush fires, which bring new, tender shoots of grass to grow in for the cattle to graze. The
primary economic activity is cattle raising, and herds of 20 and 50 and sometimes hundreds of
cattle can be seen pasturing from the national highway, a two-lane strip of road; cattle
dominate much of the cultural landscape as well. Agriculturally, rice farming dominates,
supplemented by manioc, potatoes, and various vegetables, including carrots and cucumbers.
Administratively the region extends through the Ihorombe and Ihosy regions of Madagascar;
the two largest villages are Ihosy and Ambalavao, each about 15 000 in population. Most of
the population, however, lives in small rural villages built mostly of mud brick. I will offer a
description of one village by way of illustrating the tenor of these communities, if not quite
supposing that it is a typical example. Ambalamatsara (which most locals know as “chez
Tantara,” after the name of the man who founded the village a few years back, and serves as
its chief family authority), only about 12 kilometers distant from the national highway, is a
collection of about 15 or 20 mud-brick buildings. Seven families occupy these houses, and the
heads of the households are, with one exception, all sons of the same father. The village is
surrounded by rice paddies and plots of land for growing manioc, potatoes, and various
vegetables, and is located near a small river perhaps 5 or 10 feet across on average. The rest
of the surrounding countryside is populated by scattered small trees and dhanga grass in
various stages of maturity. The nearest village is a few kilometers distant, perhaps a halfhour’s walk; until an immigrant community was built 7 kilometers away a few years back, the
nearest villages in which one could buy sugar, salt, coffee, oil, soap, or other such goods were
Andonaka or Zazafotsy, respectively 20 and 30 kilometers away. Dirt paths make
Ambalamatsara accessible by car or light truck; ours was the only one in the village. If the
isolation even in Ambalamatsara was palpable (I’ll attest to that), it is worth emphasizing the
isolation of regions even farther from the national highway, and of spaces not occupied by
villages. Uninhabited land far outweighs habitations in the Ihorombe region, and dahalo,
when they steal cattle, naturally take to these spaces rather than the roads. The adjoint to the
commandant of the Ambalavao gendarmerie noted the difficulty of pursuing dahalo: a
gendarme is only “a man like any other,” he said. He can’t run after dahalo for miles with a
heavy pack (in which to keep his supplies while out afield), only to find deserted land and
more deserted land, and keep going like it’s no thing. So in regions far from police posts, he
said, the risks of stealing cattle are not too great.
In this country, “Cattle are wealth,” my informants would tell me again and again in a
powerful refrain. Some men own herds of a couple of thousand heads of cattle; these men are
10
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the richest in the society. Those who own no cattle of their own are poor. As one of my
informants put it, the richest men here are not like men in America, with credit cards and bank
accounts; these men look out across their herds of cattle, and say to themselves, ‘There, that is
my treasure’ (Fanahy). 5 The cash economy is minimal, and land ownership is not too rigid—
before 2000, when the state demanded that every inhabitant of the Ambalamatsara region
delineate the land he used, land was not owned per se. A man would choose a spot in the area
surrounding his house to cultivate, explained Tantara, and that would be the land he farmed;
but land was not owned (or, therefore, inherited) and there were never conflicts over land.
There were about 75 000 hectares of accessible land surrounding the village he was born in,
more than enough for all of the families there (Tantara). Land was not a limited resource, and
therefore not a valuable one. 6 Tantara claimed ownership of 6 cattle, enough to work his
fields and no more; before a state raid on the village he had lived in in 2000, one motivated by
the suspected presence of dahalo, there were many, many cattle here, he told me 7 .
It is time now to better explain why I have been calling what I studied the phenomena
of dahalo. It is a problem to think of dahalo as monolithic, as belonging to only one truth.
From my interviews I elicited different, sometimes conflicting accounts of dahalo; there need
not be only one final understanding. As I talked to more and more sources, it became apparent
that their varied perspectives were not more-true or less-true glimpses of one phenomenon.
There are many players, and many levels of involvement. Above all it is not an isolated
phenomenon that exists only at the level of the village, or even the level of the region. The
effects of dahalo reach throughout Madagascar and extend internationally. When my
informants spoke of “dahalo,” each was speaking of different players and even different
contexts; dahalo in the Bongolava are not the same as dahalo in the Bara region, and within
the Bara region, too, dahalo can be involved for many different reasons. For these reasons, it
is better to consider dahalo as a set of phenomena, rather than one phenomenon.
The current network that surrounds and articulates with the theft of cattle is often
likened to the mafia. The analogy is a helpful one, and gives a fairly solid foundation for
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« Il regarde ses zebus, et il dit, ‘ça c’est mon tresor.’ »
I did speak, however, with a prisoner who explained that he was arrested and convicted based on an accusation
his neighbors made that he was a dahalo: their motivation, he said, was to get him out of the way so they could
take over his deceased parents’ land. Whether or not this story is factually correct, the apparent plausibility of the
neighbors’ motive makes it clear that land ownership is not a concept foreign to modern villages in this region.
But given the population density, there is more than enough land to meet the demand.
7
Tantara and many others in Mahabodo knew about the prospective raid even before it happened, and dispersed
out into the surrounding area just before. Some stayed. I wonder if the Mahabodo dahalo were tipped off about
the upcoming raid by interested parties high up in the state. It seems likely.
6

11

Comment [c14]: Near
Ambalamatsara

interpreting observations. But stories can take on lives of their own, can run away from the
truth they were, once, grounded in. At one point in my research, I realized that I had been
imagining a celebration an informant had told me about as taking place in a red-painted
banquet hall. The hall was warmly lit, with 500 villagers walking in from the night in their
evening finery, arriving in twos and threes, checking coats. This is unlikely. But I persisted in
imagining that, instead of Ambalamatsara, the small village that I had visited and the most
likely place to turn for a real context. We dream what is familiar.
I offer this for several reasons. First, it becomes apparent that much of this paper, in
fact, must exist in my imagination. Even with stories we know, we imagine them differently
than we know—the rhetoric takes on a life of its own. You improvise. Jazz. You write a story,
and the results surprise: you find you never knew the characters at all, you couldn’t plan them.
Even if you did create them, they get too much, they start “putting their lives together in ways
I never dreamed of,” as Toni Morrison’s narrator in Jazz says, almost from the sidelines. In
my imagination, there are no mud huts.
This brings up a second problematic: I wonder how closely my informants’ stories fit
with their knowledge. I would hear stories, told with an authority and confidence of voice, in
which higher-up dahalo interact with the president of the Republic of Madagascar to fulfill a
deal he, Marc Ravalomanana, had made in person with George W. Bush, the President of the
United States. The transaction involved 1000 of America’s dairy cows, signed over by the
president, in exchange for 5000 zebu cattle for slaughter. I had to assume that the story was
intended more as an allegory to show the scale of international exchange, with figurehead
presidents standing in symbolically for economic actors in their country, than as anything to
be taken as indicative of a typical interaction. But with other informants too, I noticed how
often my respondents pretended authority. When mere passersby were told the object of my
study, they would have two reactions, the first being to marvel at what a strange creature is
the vazaha, and the second being to tell me, quite simply, why dahalo are. They knew the
answer to every question I asked. And it can be hard to guess who is answering with an
authority of knowledge and experience, and who is inventing stories to satisfy me.
The third and final problematic suggested by this mafia analogy is that, even if the real
world is more physically persistent than the imagined, imagining things is another kind of
reality. Policy is made by mortals, who fill in imagined details when none present themselves.
If we insist too much that dahalo is like the mafia, we risk imagining only the mafia (in its
popular, silver-screen conception) in place of the phenomena we’re interested in, and any
12

resulting policy may turn out to be better suited for a film than for real people. Editor Theresa
Nielsen Hayden points out that would-be authors too often imagine (to take one of many
possible examples) that “a person who flips open an ancient mystical tome and sounds out a
bit of text in a language they don’t speak will invariably prove to be reading a dangerous and
powerful magical invocation, rather than the copyright indicia or the author’s preface.” In a
sense, what I am hoping to do are bring these small details to life. To tell this story with an
eye for the finesses and subtleties of the actual people involved—for all that dahalo seem,
from afar, to have made-for-film lives.
Dahalo, in its modern form, is organized crime, and stolen cattle may be bought and
then sold at the international level. But the reasons for choosing the targets of theft, and for
stealing cattle, are very local. One technique many of my informants used to illustrate dahalo
to me (an outsider and a novice) was to act out, in a small way, the players and connections
involved. My informant would become, perhaps, a jealous neighbor; I would become his
victim. Rubber stamps and containers of white-out, when available, would be enlisted to play
the part of dahalo or intermediaries. I will take a cue from them and offer now a story of an
imagined dahalo raid, including what comes before and after the event of the theft, hoping
thereby to present a backdrop against which the more in-depth discussion will look more
comprehensible. The understanding I present emerged very gradually over the course of my
fieldwork, informed by many different sources, each giving a window onto one aspect of the
theft. Together, a coherent network of events emerges. 8
Interlude: Story
Jesse Thorn and Jordan Morris live in the same village, 40 kilometers outside of Ihosy,
Madagascar, and they have a problem. Jordan and Jesse are both marriageable bachelors, aged
20 and 22, and, as fate would have it, they like the same girl. Coco is her name. Coco flirts
with both of them, and shows no strong preference for either one. Jordan comes from a fairly
wealthy family in the village; his dad has a herd of 1500 cattle. When Jordan moved out on
his own away from his family, at age 16, he asked his father to deed him in advance his share
of the cattle (there are four other boys in Jordan’s family, although some are by his father’s
second wife). His father complied, and Jordan now has 200 cattle of his own, divided into 4
groups, each pastured in its own section of the land surrounding the village. Sometimes
Jordan goes to visit his cattle (and sometimes he takes Coco with him), to check up on them
8
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and make sure he knows where they are, and of course it gives him pride. Look at those cattle,
he thinks to himself—all mine. And it’s true they look lovely, for this is the herd of the oldest
cattle, the fattest, the most valuable. Their humps sway as they move, in what Jordan imagines
is a stately fashion.
Jesse has no cattle of his own; his father died when he was young, in a dahalo attack
on the village—he was in the pasture still when the thieves came, and when he shot at them,
they saw the flame of his gun against the night—, and his mother cultivates but it has only
been enough to keep afloat for these past few years. Jesse, nonetheless, is healthy. For a while
tensions have been growing between the two, Jesse, Jordan; it started out with this girl Coco,
but has since become a matter of much smaller things, of other friends, of imagined slights.
One day Jesse does what has been growing in his mind all along—he goes into Ihosy on
Sunday, on foot, with one of his friends in the village, Wofy. Wofy is a dahalo, as everyone in
the village knows, but also a friend of Jesse’s, and so this is not too remarkable, the two of
them going off together. You can never be certain when Wofy is being a dahalo, and when he
is just being Wofy. In Ihosy, Wofy takes Jesse to the house of an older man, two kilometers
outside town. The older man is a dahalo too, but has been in the game for a while; he’s risen
to the status of organizer. His name is Harold. Harold hosts meetings every Sunday here in
Ihosy, and dahalo, when they’re looking for work (i.e., cattle to be stolen), come to his house
to be divided up into gangs to go after targets. At around 1 the meeting comes to order. Wofy
has already introduced Jesse to Harold, and told him Jesse’s purpose. (If you haven’t guessed
by now, here it is: Jesse is going to have Jordan’s cattle stolen.) 10 dahalo fill the room; these
are senior lieutenants, each with several men of their own waiting farther outside the village.
All told they represent 50 dahalo looking for work. Harold asks how many guys are willing to
go on a raid to Jesse’s village for a theft of 50 cattle; 4 of the lieutenants, all from the other
side of Ihosy and well distant from the target village, raise their hands. They represent 30
men. It takes on average about 2 men per head of cattle stolen, so Jesse indicates that this will
work if all 30 can do it, and says that there are 4 guns in his village; how many guns can they
contribute? They have 5 hunting rifles between them. That’s fine, Jesse says, for two of the
guns are in the same house and can be held by one man. Harold says that his superior will pay
150 000 Malagasy FMG per head delivered, and the lieutenants talk between them for a
minute. If they didn’t take this price, someone else would elsewhere, so they look up and
agree to do it. It is arranged that they will deliver the cattle to a point 6 kilometers outside
Vohibe, a discreet location. And so Jesse leaves with the four lieutenants to go round up the
14
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rest of the men. Wofy stays in the house; he is looking for work elsewhere, somewhere distant
from his and Jesse’s village. It would not do to steal in the same village.
When Jesse and his dahalo are all together, Jesse maps out the layout of the village,
with squares to mark each house and x’s to represent the guns, and tells the group how many
cattle they will be stealing and where the pasture of the herd of the fattest zebus is located. It
will be best to strike around midnight, he says; the cattle group together in the northeast
corner around that time, and the village will be asleep. They arrange a date, two weeks later—
a Tuesday—and the dahalo ask Jesse a few more questions, then all is settled and Jesse starts
the walk back home.
After he leaves, the dahalo joke around some. Three of the lieutenants have worked
together before, and have a fairly standard plan. Two wrestle briefly. They won’t leave yet,
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not tonight; best to be safe. Most of the men are in their late teens or early twenties; the
lietenants are a little bit older, though still quite fit.
A week and a half later, the éclaireur of the group, Peter, does his usual pre-theft
routine—walks to the village and sets up camp a few kilometers outside, in the trees lining a
small river. He checks on the cattle the night before the raid is scheduled to happen, to make
sure that they are still pasturing in the same place and following the same routine. All is well.
He settles down and waits.
The next evening the others arrive, on foot as always, with more bags of peanuts and
manioc. They have been traveling for some days, staying at houses of dahalo they know along
the route, or in safe spots the friends have arranged outside villages. They check in briefly and
then divide themselves into three groups of ten. One group is made up of the thieves
themselves, who will take the cattle from the pasture, round them up and run them out a
kilometer away from the village. Another group will be waiting at this relay station, to take
the cattle out the rest of the way. The first group will pass off the cattle and then go back to
fortify the last group—which has been stationed in the village, with all but one of the guns,
covering all the doors so that no villager can escape to follow the stolen cattle. They make
sure especially to cover the doors of the houses with rifles.
The plan goes off without a hitch. Jesse has been pretending to be asleep in his bed,
eyes half-open, waiting. Dogs bark to raise the alarm when the dahalo steal in to guard the
doors, but by the time anyone has woken up, except for Jesse and Old Man Thurber (who
sleeps poorly these days), they are all stationed. The villagers know that to try to leave the
house now, even unarmed, even a child, is to be shot. They lay low in their houses. By the
15
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time the dahalo back away from the village, the group with the stolen zebu is two hours
ahead. The zebu dung is cold. 24 hours later, they are 200 kilometers to the northwest.
The villagers contact the gendarmes as soon as possible, but it is too late to catch the
dahalo; they have gone through territory where there are no roads, and these are truly athletic
men. Even the gendarmes who could possibly keep up are too late for it to be worth spending
the money to go after these cattle. They take the information and the tag numbers of the stolen
cattle, and say that they will keep an eye out for anyone trying to sell them.
The dahalo deliver the cattle to the appointed meeting spot, to another group of men,
cattle herders for a significant cattle owner in the area. They receive their pay: 150 000 per
head, just under 300 000 FMG each. It’s enough to buy 10 beers each and a prostitute for a
night, though not all will use it for just that; many will, but some will take the money to a
party in their village, and spend extravagantly hoping to charm a particular girl; another will
buy a nice shirt the next time he’s in Ihosy, and a cell phone (he buys a Celtel SIM card, even
though there is no phone service in his village); another will take that money home to build a
house for his family, and maybe there will be enough left over to buy more candles and some
sugar.
The cattle are now in the hands of this new group of men. They are delivered to their
new owner, a man with business relations with a buyer in Antananarivo; he will add the cattle
to his herd. He gets about 50 new cattle every few months. When the cattle come he has
already prepared their papers (the numbers on the eartags of the cattle need to be filled in still,
but it is signed and stamped with approval from the mayor’s office; a small amount had to be
paid for the favor. It is not too much, to this cattle owner, though it is a significant amount to
that employee in the mayor’s office, a welcome addition to his salary.). In a year’s time the
gendarmes, after news of a nearby dahalo raid, come around and ask to inspect his herd. He
takes the captain of the gendarmes inside, to show him his book with all of his cattle
registered. 1 000 000 FMG fall from the pages of the book into the hands of the captain. This
is more than a month’s salary for him, and as much as he would like to count through these
cattle, it hasn’t been easy to buy his kids notebooks and feed his family at the same time
lately. He agrees that all is in order and heads back to his team. They will look elsewhere,
says the captain.
In another two years, the cattle owner sells these 50 cattle, at 2 500 000 FMG each, to
his buyer in Tana, a man with connections to senators, ministers. No one looks at the sale too
closely, and everyone profits some. Even if the original owner had walked right next to the
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cattle, he would not recognize them—they are bigger, fatter. 9 They were stolen cattle once,
but now they are well-documented, and the theft was long ago. It is not a theft for these
players, but a trade; business, just business.
And Jordan? He got the girl after all. He lost 50 cattle, but still there were 150 left, and
for Coco, who liked Jesse and Jordan about equally well, it was not a difficult choice.
(So These Are The Characters)
Move Along
This, as I have said, is one story. It is a story I have written more to illustrate the
general scope of a “typical” theft than to give a qualitative, sensitive, detailed touch to the
phenomenon. . But the longer I have waited to identify one gaping hole in this research, the
more uncomfortable I have felt, so it will be best to admit, now, that my understanding of
dahalo is riddled with partiality. I do not really know when dahalo marry, and who they
marry when they do, and if they still go after girls after marriage, and anyway who become
dahalo in any village, and for how long? It is a partial, sometimes confused picture that I have
been able to glimpse, as looking at something for the first time but through a kaleidescope,
and not half so regular. I know types that circulate in the popular imagination (some of which
join together in a coherent narrative; some of which do not), but I do not know what kind of
basis in lived experience they have. This stems from the fact, as noted in my presentation of
methodology, that I did not live among dahalo, did not see which imagined characters are
shadows of which real people the storyteller has known; do not know how many times stories
had been retold, transmitted, and lost some in translation. It is a problem stemming from the
chaotic nature of my informants—gendarmes and Italian expatriate Jesuits and displaced
immigrants and “true” locals—each drawing from vastly different worlds and experiences. To
live in Southern Madagascar is not a homogenizing thing. And all of these are local, none
more authentic than any other. What I do know: from amid the jumble, actors emerge who
steal cattle because they need the money to win girls, or build their wealth. It is unclear
precisely who these actors are, and how the adaptive problems they face differ from similar
men who do not become dahalo. As a foreigner in southern Madagascar, I am very visible,
reasonably powerful, and so I can’t slip below the radar too easily. I can’t learn things without
9

One technique to disguise stolen cattle is to change the color of the coats by throwing hot sand on them, sand
like in the Sahara (Fanahy).
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people being very conscious that I’m learning them, which is a matter of my methodology
and, too, its outcome: a paper to be, in some fashion at least, published. I’m in a position of
power, but that power annuls my ability to gain and report information. This especially
highlights that I am coming into a world with power relations already in place, and people
will put me into a category even before they have seen me: a foreigner making investigations
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on the subject of dahalo. It is not a category dahalo will be expected to welcome.
Still, we make do, and make advances. It becomes apparent that the phenomenon of
dahalo does not involve only the theft of cattle, or only thieves. It is spread wide, over much
of Madagascar, in violence and corruption and business as usual, and, accordingly, there are
many possible points to begin analysis. I will focus on only one of them: on the level at the
root of this phenomenon, the basic unit, without which it might well roll to a halt—the young
men who become cattle thieves, dahalo. It is not the only window into these activities. But it
is one window. What motivates them to steal? What do they gain, and what options does this
violence open up for them—and what risks, too? What is it about these circumstances, this
environment, that speaks violence as the best option in the minds of these young men? Now
that we have an idea of the general tenor of the activities, the players who might be involved,
the interactions, the networks, we can procede with a more detailed analysis.
Part II: Analysis
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Running on Empty
Who are dahalo? One of the most obvious findings of my research was that there are
many kinds; many levels of involvement, and involvement in different aspects of the
phenomena. There are the bureaucratic dahalo, what one informant called the “dahalo ambola
ny tabatra” (dahalo of the office), who falsify papers and accept bribes—the magistrates, the
gendarmes, the judges (Fanahy). 10 There are the chefs de dahalo, who organize raids and pay
the muscle (minimally) for their services. There are the dahalo who buy stolen cattle. There
are the malaso, who form the armed bands to steal cattle in the pay of the chefs de dahalo.
There are the protectors, who ensure the security of an entire network of dahalo, to the point
of arranging the deaths of any, dahalo or otherwise, who have leaked information about the
10

Much of the information that follows is a result of two extensive interviews with FANAHY Solo
Pierre, a 60-year-old politician who lives just outside of Ihosy. Fanahy is from the Bara ethnic group,
has spent much time in the bush, and has known dahalo over many years.
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organization (anonymous source). There are the mpanarivo, the men to whom malaso deliver
their stolen cattle and who hold them safe from the law between the theft and the sale. There
are the mavo, what my religious source identified as the lowest level of cattle thief—young
men 16 or 17 years old, poor, who take cattle from their corrals. 11
Each of these kinds, if we can presume to categorize, is made up of its own typical
players. I will focus on only one category of dahalo, those who do the work of stealing the
cattle—which is also the category most locals imagine when they hear the word, and the
players they tend to be most familiar with. By my hypothesis, these men should be on the low
end of a position of significant inequality in reproductive outlook, a low end that can best be
left behind with a violent strategy. And my informants often identified poverty as a cause at
the root of the production of dahalo. 12
Some of my sources characterized dahalo as the lazy poor—they might well work, but
choose to steal instead (Suzanne; Commandant, Ambalavao; Fanahy). These thefts, to them,
are problems of character. Few people are willing to offer any other explanation, or even
entertain one—it is only indirectly that other characteristics emerge, or after deeper
conversation, as with Fanahy. Sources agreed that dahalo come from “the bush, not the city”
(Fanahy). They’re aged between 12 and 40, said Fanahy; 12, notably, seemed to be the age at
which he considered adolescence and manhood to begin (never 11, never 13). At age 12, he
said, boys begin wanting to show that they’re independent, and so for their income start
stealing cattle; their parents are farmers, and so they mooch off of their parents for the basic
necessities of subsistence and shelter. His kids did exactly that: lazed around the house all
day, and when they got up hung out with lots of other “bad faith” kids, and that is how they
were pulled into the dahalo game. It is interesting to note that he identifies the parents of
dahalo not as dahalo themselves (elsewhere, he had said that being a dahalo was “almost
inherited”) but as farmers; I would suggest that this is not meant too literally but in the
commonly accepted sense that everyone who lives in the country is a farmer. Given 80 boys
11

Mavo is the Malagasy word for “yellow”—these thieves are so named because the soil of this region, a red,
dense soil when it is on the ground, coats their clothing as they steal the cattle. As they are always on the run,
with no time to wash their clothes, their shirts and pants and feet take on a yellow color, the color of the earth.
12
On what appears at first a side note, they would also identify conflict (perhaps over girls, as with Jesse and
Jordan) as the way the targets for thefts are chosen. Though such conflict involves different players than those
that we are primarily concerned with—not dahalo themselves but rather those who direct them to a given
victim—it is no less involved in the outcome. It is a sign of the importance of owning cattle, the wealth and
value assigned to that, and also a measure of a definite inequality in cattle ownership. As we move through the
words of my informants, inequality in cattle ownership will show itself more and more linked to inequality of
reproductive access.
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in a village, he continued, perhaps 10 will farm, and the other 70 will become dahalo. He
explains that these 70 are simply boys of bad faith, who don’t want to “take up the spade” and
do the work of farming. The parents of all boys give them guiding morals around the hearth,
telling them “you mustn’t give up the spade;” the 10 who farm are the ones who listened to
their parents.
Nearly everyone I talked to hastened to say that dahalo were “people like everyone
else,” who live in villages and, to an outsider, are no different from the others. “Like us,” said
Fanahy, “they have an identification card, a birth certificate.” It’s not stamped on their
forehead, he said. The differences my informants note tend to be ones of character. Fanahy
continued, “But the spirit…” He trailed off here, and then offered that dahalo were like bats:
“It’s during the night that they work. During the day, they sleep. That’s how the dahalo are.”
They don’t farm, he said, because they’re tired from working all night; although if they’re in
town for a long time, they will work (presumably in the fields of their family). The
commandant of the Ihosy gendarmerie (who is perhaps farther removed from actual dahalo)
made similar comments. They were only poorly raised, he said—farmers who want “a little
bit more” than what they will make by selling their produce. The Malagasy religious man
with whom I spoke was more sympathetic. The dahalo friend he had had, he said, was among
the poorest in his village.
It is worth noting at this point, briefly and inexhaustively, the form cattle theft has
historically taken in Bara culture. Continuing at least into the 1940s, young men seeking to
marry young women would steal the cattle of their father-in-law-to-be; one or two, never very
many. If the man succeeded at stealing these cattle, it was apparent to everyone involved that
he was strong enough to protect the daughter of the “victim.” It is a custom which has been
coopted and transformed into this modern variation. In towns and cities, it is more rarely
practiced; there are undoubtedly some villages where such theft is to this day considered
necessary, but levels of adherence vary, I am sure. Cattle theft as organized crime took off in
the 1970s, with the regime of Didier Ratsiraka and the Second Republic (Fanahy). In this new
situation and environment, which is quite different from the environment in Madagascar
through the 1940s, the phenomenon can become what it is—organized crime. But that is not
putting a fine enough point on the matter. I will trace how the phenomenon sustains on an
individual level, while paying attention also to how the macroscopic social environment
shapes and interacts with that, makes it possible and comprehensible, when viewed from an
evolutionary light. To do this, I’ll attend to three aspects of being a dahalo: strength shown in
20

stealing; the use of money gained; and the activities of dahalo of, shall we say, more mature
years. The first will illustrate responses to dahalo; the second, some of the immediate actions
dahalo take with their winnings; and the third, the hope behind it all, the hope of moving up.
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Beating Plowshares into Swords
The theft of cattle is a highly demanding physical activity, more so than farming even,
and as such can offer women very trustworthy insight into a man’s fitness as a mate. Stealing
shows strength. Young men become dahalo, the commandant of the Ambalavao gendarmerie
told me, “to show that they are strong.” He had explained to me that there were three prime
factors behind dahalo: custom, poverty, and competition for marriage. Here he is speaking
about what he called the custom side of dahalo. If you never steal any cattle, he said,
historically and culturally, “everyone dominates you.” On the other hand, everyone is afraid
of a “king of cattle theft.” This word king that he used is loaded with connotations of
dominance, of wealth, of power. Everyone in a community knows who the dahalo are, he
said: “it’s an honor” to be a dahalo. When I asked asked if they were married, he looked at me
in disbelief, as if to ask if I had even been listening to him: of course they are married, he said,
this is “the strongest man in the village” we’re talking about. This explanation is fairly typical
of explanations of the “cultural” side of cattle theft; my sources differed, however, about how
much that customary aspect was alive in practice today. Notably, “competition for marriage,”
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aside from chalking it up to custom, was the third and last of the commandant’s constellation
of key factors that influence a young man to act as a dahalo. The commandant said that
dahalo also steal in order to be competitive potential mates: if he and another guy were
competing for a girl, he said, and the other guy was wealthier in cattle than he was, she will
always choose the other guy. Suitability for marriage is directly related to how many cattle
you own: he who owns more is the marrier.
Prosper, an Ambalavao resident and dahalo expert, said that once, young girls were
attracted to dahalo, and successful dahalo could have their pick of the women in the village to
marry. No longer, he says. Girls recognize that dahalo are men “looking for problems in life;”
on top of this, for each zebu stolen four must be paid in return, and those come from the
family of the thief. This price is prohibitive (if a dahalo is caught). If what he says is true of
the current situation, it could be that young men are only hoping to become dahalo to quickly
make a windfall of money or cattle, and then get out of the game and look for a wife with
whom to settle down.
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Jimmy and Donatien, two instructors at a school which houses many children of
dahalo, told me that a villager is not considered a real man until he has been to prison. It is
not enough to steal cattle. When you come back an ex-convict, they said, you get a hero’s
welcome in your village. Young girls and women jump at you. You are famous. They said
that the custom of stealing cattle for marriage is alive and well in the countryside; if you are
educated and want to marry a girl from one of the larger towns (like Ihosy), you might not do
it, but if you wanted to return to your village and marry a girl from there, the father probably
wouldn’t grant permission until you had stolen zebu, to prove that you are strong enough to
protect his daughter. Suzanne, the secretary of the urban commune of Ihosy, echoed what
Jimmy and Donatien had said, but placed that custom 50 years prior: in the past, she said,
women would ask a suitor if he had been to jail. If he had not, she would not accept him as a
husband (it is interesting to note that most men, in contrast to Suzanne, put the approval or
denial of a suitor, not on the shoulders of the bride-to-be, but on those of her family). Being to
prison made him a man. Even if he was rich, even if he had stolen cattle aplenty—if he had
not been to jail, she would not accept him. Fanahy (Suzanne’s cousin, and likely the source of
the information she told me) said that, historically (through 1940 or so), if a man had never
stolen cattle and, especially, never been to prison, he was considered “a coward.” Having
been to prison showed that he was “a truly good guy;” he had done the act “before the
people,” brazenly—“he’s a warrior, him, a fighter” the villagers would say among
themselves. 13 When he came out of jail, all the families would press their daughters toward
him, saying, “this is a man.” Now, though, “everyone distrusts an ex-convict.” “Be careful,”
they tell each other, “he’s a bad guy.” These days, to be marriageable is to have worked
honestly (Fanahy).
I spoke also to a Malagasy religious man, who had grown up in the Bongolava
region 14 and had a close friend in his youth who was a dahalo. Before, he said, when it was
cultural, there were rules. You would go into a neighboring village and steal the cattle there,
and if you made it out past a certain limit, a halfway line, the people of that village would
raise their hands in defeat and let their cattle go. 15 They would acknowledge that you were the
13

While this is not a subject I will pursue in this paper, Fanahy’s responses suggest that to be a convicted dahalo
was considered a sort of rebellion against state power. It is notable that the Bara were among the least subjugated
of any of Madagascar’s ethnic groups, either under the French colonial regime or the Merina pre-colonial one.
There is a story about the Fandana rock formation that exalts a similar fierce independence among the Bara.
14
The Bongolava region is historically home not to the Bara ethnic group but to the Sakalava, and more recently
the Merina. Thus cattle theft there has a slightly different historical form; however, the points he makes serve
equally well to illustrate Bara cattle theft.
15
Like in Capture the Flag.
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stronger one, but will say, wait till next time—next week I could steal your cattle. And so it
went, back and forth, with rules. Like in a sport, he offered, you could use certain weapons
(not rifles), and there were boundaries. I find his comparison to sports a valuable one: rules,
here as in sports, perhaps served to standardize what it meant to “win;” to know what winning
indicates for the victor, i.e., that he is strongest. (There are no more rules, he seemed to
lament.) Similarly (although this is not a custom of the Bara people, said Fanahy, himself
Bara and “a native of this region [Ihosy]”), there are some southern Malagasy who do not
allow cattle to be inherited; instead, a man’s cattle are all killed upon his death. 16 This can
yield conflict between a son and a father: the son wants to get rich, and his father has 5000
zebu that will, however, all be killed on his death. The son may contact someone outside, a
fatidra (a term specific to dahalo meaning blood brotherhood) far away, and this fatidra will
(with accomplices) steal the cattle and then hold on to them for 2, 3, 4 years; meanwhile he
might give the son some of his, which have been replaced by this new influx of cattle. After
enough time, the son will take the cattle stolen from his father and become rich. It is a waste,
true, to kill all of these cattle on someone’s death, said my informant, but it is a matter of
honor to have a funeral like that. And there is a moral behind it: in this way, the son must gain
his wealth by his own strength, his own reason; the playing field is levelled with each
generation (Malagasy religious man). And so once again, I argue, the rules give a standard for
judging achievement in this work, so that achievement reflects ability as closely as possible.
To give yet another example, said the religious man, the house of the father, in some societies,
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is burned when he dies. There is also the custom that young men leave the house of their
fathers at 15 (or thereabouts), to go and seek their fortune. Then son goes far away, from his
village and his family, and perhaps starts by working and then buying some chickens. He
raises them, gets more chickens, his flock grows, until he has enough to buy some sheep,
goats, and, in the end, cattle. In this way, little by little, he builds his fortune. At 25 or 30 he
may have a sizeable herd of cattle, and then he marries.
From 1970 onwards, 17 Fanahy told me that the nature of cattle theft changed: it
became like in Westerns, he said, although instead of on horseback these thieves do
everything on foot, a sprint—they can cover 200 km in 24 hours “with their physical
strength.” So today, despite a different character to the thefts, it is still something requiring a
formidable physical fitness—women, men often told me when I asked, weren’t dahalo
16
17

A custom also mentioned by academic Rabarijaona Bernadin (personal communication).
This date, intriguingly, coincides with Madagascar’s Second Republic and Ratsiraka’s regime.
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because they couldn’t be, they are too weak physically; and dahalo are never older than 25,
said the commandant of the Ihosy gendarmes’ brigade, because 25 is “already old” for the
demanding work they must do. After 25, they have to retire. I find it worthwhile to attend to
this historical view of dahalo, because the sports interpretation seems significant: this is an
activity that, beyond offering a chance to quickly signal fitness as a provider of resources
Comment [c29]: Yeah. Now build
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(wealth), can also signal really significant physical fitness.
(Every Girl’s Crazy ‘bout a) Sharp Dressed Man
What do dahalo do with the money they earn? This is another, and a very significant,
aspect of the theft of cattle. To be a dahalo is an indicator of physical fitness, as explored
above—a perennial contender for what women are most looking for in a mate. The other
major contender is the ability to provide resources. Do young men become dahalo in order to

Comment [c30]: Jumpy, scattery.
Haven’t talked about this yet.

quickly increase their wealth?
Every informant concurred on this matter: dahalo, at least the young ones who commit
the actual thefts, do not make much money. For the best cattle, zebu weighing 400 kilos, a
dahalo might be paid 150 000 FMG a head (Fanahy). 18 These are cattle with a market value
of 2 500 000 FMG, he said. If your share of the stolen herd is 2 cattle (a typical ratio of cattle
per dahalo), you’re making 300 000—best case. “10 beers and a woman” later, he said, and
your money is finished. He suggests here what dahalo do with their earnings, from what he
calls this “mauvais travail:” they buy time with prostitutes. 19 It’s not about love in these
relationships, he would say. When I asked if dahalo were married, he said that yes, like
everyone they are married, they have kids; the difference is that they raise their children with
money they make from that work—stealing cattle—instead of another. He had broken dahalo
into two broad categories—“adolescents,”20 and “mature” men—and said that the adolescents
steal cattle so that they can have money to buy such prostitutes (the mature men’s reasons I
will present in the following section). Prosper, too, said that having money to buy prostitutes
was one reason dahalo stole; and Suzanne said that they steal for pleasure: being able to have

18

This price correlates closely with others I was given. None ranged beyond 100 000 and 200 000 Malagasy
francs.
19
It is often unclear whether informants, who tend to speak in euphemisms like “pour faire plaisir avec une
femme” or “pour se gaspiller avec les jeunes filles,” are speaking of outright prostitution or, more generally,
attracting ladies by spending money. One informant told me that, in the countryside, girls sometimes tend
towards prostitution (he attributed this to a lack of education); it could be that this prostitution is not always
formalized, and the activity occupies more of a middle ground.
20
When I pressed him, he specified “adolescent” as meaning between the ages of 12 and 30.
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money so that they can get girls, since their parents don’t give them any. 21 The gendarmes’
commandant in Ihosy too said that dahalo don’t get much money, and what they get they
spend on “girls and consuming alcohol.”
Closely linked to this usage of money for prostitution is attracting women with an eye
towards the longer term. If you walk around at a party but have nothing in your pockets, said
the adjoint to the commandant in Ambalavao, can’t even buy a beer, can’t treat girls, can’t
throw your money around in a pretense of richness with everyone watching—a guy would be
ashamed of that, he said. Suzanne identified buying clothes as one activity dahalo with
newly-filled pockets pursue. The Bara, she said, before, didn’t hardly wear real clothing; now
the boys all want to wear good clothes, nice T-shirts—they want to dress well. At one point I
had asked two schoolteachers, Jimmy and Donatien, “What is wealth?” Jimmy had asked me,
rhetorically, what context I was talking about. There are the towns and cities, he said, and
there it’s owning a car, a house. And then there’s the country; and in the country, wealth is
cattle. 22 He noted that coming from Fianarantsoa to a village, however, every villager would
consider them rich, purely from the fact that they live in the city. But they think of themselves
as poor, and no one in the city has the kind of cattle people out in the country have. I asked
Jimmy if he would call dahalo rich; “obviously,” he said. They have a lot of cattle. So goods
that aren’t really very available to villagers (recall that in Analamatsara, a rather typical
village in this respect, the closest town that sells even sugar and salt is 20 kilometers away)
take on a valuation of wealth, and for a dahalo, I hypothesized, the more you can get goods
that aren’t too available to villagers, the richer you can appear.
This was born out in my research. I had asked Fanahy what had changed between
1940 and 1970; why did the dahalo phenomenon take this new turn? At first he would say
only that the times had changed, but as I insisted, he offered that it was development, too.
“Chez les Bara, tout le monde ont des appareils” now, he said. Around 1970, development
had started to pick up. People would see things and say, “j’ai tenté d’avoir cet appareil.”
“Starting after the revolution,” young dahalo would begin to say, “I need a cell phone, I need
women; I need beer, rum.” It’s interesting that he links all of these together. Madagascar now,
he says, is “nearly modern: s’il y a des appareils chez vous [in America], ça arrive ici. Meme
en brousse.” But to get these, people steal “the goods of others.” They don’t even know how
to work the things they buy, he said: “a thing like that,” he said, indicating my tape recorder,
21
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“they want that, but they don’t even know how to work it.” It’s just a gesture. Unless it’s a
TV, something they truly enjoy, it’s just something “to show off.” He emphasized that it’s
been since the revolution that this has changed: there’s less state control. He gives the
example of all the approval needed to buy a gun, during colonialism, when you had to go
through each level of government, from the neighborhood on up. Now it all happens outside
the reach of the state. If you want a good thing, you have to buy it with bad money, money
from the “mauvais jeu.” There’s not enough otherwise. Now, “if you have money, you can
buy anything.” Money is easy to find here, but you never know where anyone’s money came
from. “Ici chez nous, il n’y a pas de controle entre le fanjakana et le people, quoi. Ca
provoque de mauvaise foi pour les malfaiteurs.” Dahalo, then, can win girls they wouldn’t
have gotten otherwise—both prostitution and general sexual competiton requires money that
they wouldn’t have, if they didn’t steal it.
I Did It My Way
“Hope has two daughters, anger and courage. They are both lovely.”
(attributed to St. Augustine)

One of the foundations of my argument has been that violence, as an inherently risky
strategy (it invites reciprocation in kind), should be tempting only when it seems to offer hope
for advancement. Even when this hope is distant and slim, if the average benefits to fitness
outweigh the average costs, it is hope enough. What are the possible futures once a man has
chosen this path? Who is he looking to become?
I have asked this question to several sources: is there any hope for low-level dahalo to
ascend through the ranks and become a higher-up dahalo, like the chefs de dahalo? Typically
the answer has been no: there is no hope. The Malagasy religious man was one of these; they
are paid too little, he said, to move up. I asked why dahalo didn’t ask for a higher price for the
cattle they delivered; after all, the bosses couldn’t sell the cattle without someone to steal it.
They are an integral piece. He said that yes, they could ask for higher prices; but the boss
would simply take his work order elsewhere. There are plenty of dahalo who will be willing
to do it for the going price, as low as it is. It’s a question of supply and demand, he said. 23
And this low pay makes sense: in any hierarchy, the person on top is always at a dangerous
23
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Comment [c32]: Now you need to
analyze. Say why you told us all this.
What does it show.

position. When UNC is number one in the nation in college basketball (as happens quite
often) 24 , every team the Tar Heels play gears up especially for that game. They are trying to
knock down the number one seed, to take a victory over what is (no longer, they are hoping)
the best team in the country. If you’re on top, you’re precariously so. And in organized crime,
the bosses, knowing this fact, should take the lion’s share of the money; the muscle, the
lieutenants will get their cut, but never enough to approach what the bosses take. Because if it
is all share and share alike, some uppity young dahalo can make enough to garner power and
a faction of his own, and, just maybe, knock off the guy on top.
And again, as Fanahy was sketching me a fuller picture of the chef de dahalo, he told
me that this was someone small-fry dahalo couldn’t hope to become. And he is not easily
attacked or knocked down, he said: he knows the gendarmes, the courts of justice, the
procureur… and on top of all this (and perhaps because of it), he is very much feared among
the dahalo. But the more Fanahy spoke, the more it seemed possible that some dahalo—if not
the average dahalo, or even a moderately successful one—might hope for such prospects.
“There are grades, like the military,” he said.25 First you have the cadets, who know nothing
at all and are new to the game. These start low and learn “little by little.” There is a
progression, an advancement. “There are stages,” he said, “grades, steps.” There’s the chef
and he has his team; a vice-commander, who tells the men, that’s your leader there, you need
to listen to him (he’s not “a leader by studies, but a leader by physical force,” Fanahy noted).
And there is a specialization between the dahalo, he said. There’s an “operateur…
dispositions de combat… les tireurs d’élite.” Every group has its sharpshooter, and every
group its éclaireur. “Il y a un sprint qui est dangereux a mille mètres ou bien à marathon.”
These last are the ones who can do 200 km in 24 hours, and it is they who make up the relay
subgroup that take the stolen zebu far from the village. “C’est un jeu!” he said, “un jeu, un
sport. Mais un jeu…un mauvais jeu. Exploitation de l’homme par l’homme, ça. Il ne garde
pas les mots de Dieu. Mais il a volé…”
Then there are the experienced, older dahalo, and these are the leaders. The chef de
dahalo is always “un grand patron,” he said—because conversely, if anyone has that many
zebus, you can bet he did some bad things in the past. But now “he has left the mauvais jeu,”
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and raises cattle, calls the dahalo together and makes the orders. 26 These are “the foremost
thieves,” he said: these higher-ups and the fanjakana, the people behind it all, the bureaucrats,
the gendarmes, the magistrates, are the “premiers responsables” of the operation. They are
the ones making real money off of stolen cattle. There’s a lot of money that disappears in
between the 100 or 150 thousand per head the thieves bring back, and the 2.5 million the
cattle are sold for: “tu vois le décalage de bénéfice?” said Fanahy. “Il y a de bénéfice, ça.”
The malaso and mavo, I want to highlight, steal cattle because they are the most valuable
commodity, but they do not get all this value: so also they may be stealing for the cachet it
brings, the cultural value, in a sense, of cattle. (It’s like talking to the president: it doesn’t
matter too much if you talk to him and he takes your advice on domestic policy, or if you
talked about the weather or the best way to tie a pair of shoes. It’s that you can tell people that
you talked to the president. Any material benefits are welcome but not a requirement.)
Describing the patron, the chef de dahalo, 27 Fanahy said that he is “un type guerrier”
and always lives “en brousse, au village.” He has no bank account; “il regarde ses zebus, et il
dit, ‘ça c’est mon tresor.’ ” He’ll have “un homme de confiance,” who knows where he
stashes his money—maybe in a hole in the floor. If you look at his house, it’s not much: “on
regarde la cabane: c’est une mauvaise cabane.” There is not even a bed to sleep on—he
sleeps on mats on the floor. He buys nothing (“c’est ça l’erreur,” said Fanahy. “C’est ça
l’erreur.”) He walks around with “pas de sandales, de souliers. Au pieds nus.” The barefoot
millionnaire. He doesn’t want to show everyone that he is a wealthy patron (although
everyone does know, even the fanjakana), doesn’t want to be “devant tout le monde.” “Il reste
lugubre,” he said, folding his arms and tucking his chin down. If one of his zebu dies, he
cries. If one of his men, the dahalo he commissions, dies, never. There is one situation in
which he shows his wealth: when a member of the family dies. “Quand il y a de malheur chez
la famille.” For the celebration he buys wine, rum, 50 cases of beer, even, said Fanahy, even
whiskey—Bretonne, or JB. Not something for “les hautes personnalités,” mind you, just
simple old Bretonne, whiskey for the masses. He kills two of his zebu for the feast. On these
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So it seems that the “game” refers only to the dahalo actively involved in the theft. Which is very interesting,
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Who simultaneously, I gathered, was the guy who makes the plans for who and when to attack, and is a large
cattle owner, and a warrior no less; the category seems to hold more roles than one man could possibly perform.
He has subsumed them, acquired powers he surely delegates to people less visible to the popular imagination. As
Theresa Nielsen Hayden notes, “It’s remarkable how many novels show us immensely powerful politicians,
religious leaders, and corporate executives who have little or no staff, know everything that’s going on in their
organization, and can completely reconfigure their schedules on one or two days’ notice.”
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occasions, everyone in the village comes and sees the wealth of this man: beer, wine, rum,
whiskey too! It’s quite a celebration.
And if someone in the village dies, someone who is not a family member, he will give
one zebu to the celebration. “Il a honte s’il ne peut pas donner un zebu au sein de village.”
Because everyone knows he can well afford at least that much.
Do any ever pull out, I ask? Maybe a friend dies in combat. That happens, he says,
“but it’s more rare.” More often a dahalo would see this death and say, “That’s for him, God
had that in mind for him.” 28 Among the 70, maybe 5 say they’ll stop this « mauvais travail. »
He is not killed upon leaving, as Frere Fazio had suggested, but stays quiet like everyone else.
And his chef de dahalo knows that that was one of his men, but thinks to himself, oh, he’s left
the game, “he won.” 29 This suggests that dahalo might, sometimes, hope or imagine that they
might “win” and then pull out with their winnings while they’re ahead and still alive. Though
in this case, in fact he hasn’t won, said Fanahy, but has decided that this game leads to death,
he’s listened to his parents, who say, “you must stay at home. You must take up the spade.” 30
Regarding the electronic gadgets that so attract the younger dahalo, he said: the patron
looks at them and says, that’s a waste, that. I’ll keep my treasure for my kids. It’s also that he
has no education, and thinks that God gave him his treasure, that “it’s not for everyone. I can’t
throw away my treasure.” 31 Fanahy put it this way: he doesn’t want to make the exchange
because, to him, money is just paper, and he has given away the thing of real value. He’s not
used to putting anything in the bank. He thinks the bank is the state, doesn’t trust it; he wants
to keep his money for himself, his family. So when money changes, he doesn’t change with it.
He keeps his outdated currency, not even knowing that it is no longer in circulation.
Fanahy had divided dahalo into two general categories: adolescents and mature men.
These of the second, he said, steal cattle for a different reason than the first: rather than to
throw get money only to throw it away, these steal in order to increase the size of their herd.
He gave an example which illustrates one possible situation.
Some rich cattle owners, he said, sell their daughters off as spouses to dahalo, in
exchange for protection for his herd of zebu (daughters are sometimes considered “as
merchandise”, he added. Their wishes don’t figure much into it: “she has no choice but to
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love” 32 ). The dahalo won’t attack another dahalo, or the father-in-law of one, so by marrying
a dahalo into his family, he gains a kind of immunity. The daughters rarely marry otherwise,
he said: sometimes they marry, yes, but only with “gens bien renseignés,” people high up in
the government. These older dahalo, it seems, are competitive with (what I imagine would be)
quite wealthy men; but it is a marriage of (financial) interest, he said, “not of love.” Which is
interesting all in itself. These dahalo do not usually marry officially into the family; they are
“types volants,” and so it is more of a concubinage than an actual marriage. He went into
further detail: a dahalo might come to a village and say to the big patron there, hi, I’d like to
work for you as a cattle herder. The patron says, OK, sure. So the dahalo stays a week, a
month, and strikes up “relations” with one of the daughters of the patron. Everyone knows
this guy is a dahalo, so the father allows the two to, in some unofficial sense, marry. The
dahalo stays in the village for 2 or 3 years. At the end of this time he tells the father he is
going to go steal some cattle, and he says, “Papa, can I take a gun of yours along?” The father
grants this, and the dahalo goes out on this mission. He comes back later with 50 cattle, and
says to the father, “I won, Papa!” Here’s 10 cattle for you, he says, because the father reminds
him that it was his gun he used to steal the cattle; he gives 10 cattle to the daughter, and keeps
the rest himself. And then, after five years, one day he’s gone forever. Maybe he’s dead
somewhere. Maybe he left. That’s expected, that’s what it means to be a type volant, not a
resident. As he told this story, acting out the part of the son, he sounded affectionate,
subservient. On the part of the father, he sounded proud of the son: at one point the fathercharacter said, “What a guy. He’s pretty strong, this guy.” 33 It is these older dahalo, he said,
who bring cattle home and hold on to them, often keeping them semi-wild—visiting once or
twice a week to check up on them, but otherwise letting them roam free.
This kind of behaviour for the older dahalo poses a problem, Fanahy noted. Despite
networks of fatidra or vakra, blood brotherhood, there is conflict between dahalo. Another
dahalo might see that this one has accumulated a sizeable herd, and say to himself, we
worked together, he and I. We were the same generation. How did he come to have all this
wealth, and me none? And, because he has accumulated wealth, this mature dahalo is no
longer considered a dahalo, no longer bound by the ties of common purpose, and no longer
immune from attack. The jealous dahalo steals his cattle. The old dahalo, who had
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accumulated a wealth of cattle, becomes poor once more. “Ça roule à machine,” said Fanahy.
And so it goes.
Part III: Beginnings (Again)
Drawing Hands
Through all of these observations, we see opportunity in violence, with risk minimized
by the form this aggression takes. Dahalo steal cattle always at a distance from the people
with whom they compete (and love and everything else), and minimal state control allows
theft with relative impunity. Dahalo gain in reproductive fitness from these thefts. In the short
term, the activity is one that, like sports, demonstrates considerable fitness, as evidenced by
the popular perception of dahalo, historically and currently, as among the strongest men out
there. On top of this, the money they earn is enough to be competitive as prospective mates—
dahalo buy gadgets and shirts, and they treat girls, showing off their ability to provide. When
dahalo are interested in only the very short term, they buy time with prostitutes. And in the
long term, there is the prospect, though it is always slim, of accumulating a wealth of cattle—
of climbing the workplace ladder, as it were, to become a dahalo at least somewhat higher in
the ranks, a chef de dahalo or an organizer or, even, only a dahalo who keeps cattle of his
own on the side. Once a man gains enough wealth in cattle, he has sufficient capital to set the
ball rolling—to buy another 50 stolen cattle every month, to pay the necessary bribes. It is not
easy when there’s little credit to be had—it is a possibility that, one source suggested, may
only be available through violence. (Recall Fanahy’s observation that, if anyone has that many
cattle (as a wealthy patron), you can bet he got there by doing some bad things.) “Tu vois que
tu as un pays sous-developpé ?” said Fanahy. “Pour cela, ça c’est obligé, ça—obligé de faire
un mauvais jeu comme ça.” If you want a good thing, you have to buy it with bad money, he
suggested. And because few people use banks, there is no paper trail—all money is more or
less clean, and you never know where it came from.
And the system is set up to self-perpetuate. The positive feedback of violence on itself
is something that has long been noted, but some explanations fall short of being able to inform
workable strategies to break the cycle. 34 “A sensible man will be quicker on the trigger in
what he perceives to be a relatively violent setting than in an apparently peaceful one, for
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example,” note Daly and Wilson, “not because he has become acculturated or has internalized
local norms about the legitimacy of violence but because of a perceived shift in the risk of
life-threatening action by antagonists.” The same is true for possession of cattle as for lives:
both are valuable, and violence can be an effective strategy for retaining both. Such cycles of
violence, I suggest (following Daly and Wilson) may be products of processes different than
the ones we have attended to up to this point.
Which leaves us at a sort of prisoners’ dilemma, and the result a tragedy of the
commons. The best strategy for each individual results in an outcome that no one wants, the
worst for the collective whole, and not much good for anyone. This study suggests that any
solutions should consider what choices there are to change the environment, the system, the
game, and the resulting equilibrium.
Another reason, Fanahy proposed, that dahalo are “difficult to erase” is that there is a
“commune” between them and the government. The heart of the government is not in it, on
these individual levels—on the level of each gendarme or mayor who takes a bribe. But it is
also a structural problem: they wouldn’t take the bribe if it weren’t so hard to turn down,
given their salary. The phenomenon of cattle theft is not isolated, small, but connected to
much larger environments, situations; dahalo play this “mauvais jeu” for a multitude of
reasons. This is the sense I got also from the adjoint to the commandant of the gendarmes in
Ambalavao: there are always multiple causes, he said. Among a group of dahalo, some will
be doing it to treat girls; some for fun; some in order to survive, scrape out a living; some in
order to build a house for their family. Always there are different reasons. I felt strongly that
he understood what it was to be a dahalo—thought of it not as criminal but as, in some sense,
the only option. If dahalo was something bad, it was bad on a structural level, not on an
individual, criminal level. A level of economy, not morality. This kind of understanding, I
think, combined with increased democracy so that power is taken by locals—the experts—is
what will help most to bring about change for the better. We can draw our own hands, as it
were, rather than take what is dealt to us.
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